Assaulted with 2-chlorobenzalmalononitrile Gas! Gas! Gas! CAMP LEJEUNE, NC, UNITED STATES 03.06.2019
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Assaulted with 2-chlorobenzalmalononitrile Gas! Gas! Gas!
CAMP LEJEUNE, NC, UNITED STATES
03.06.2019
Video by Lance Cpl. Aaron Douds
2nd Marine Division
U.S. Marines with 2nd Battalion, 2nd Marine Regiment, 2nd Marine Division, are assaulted with 2-chlorobenzalmalononitrile gas in defensive positions during a field training exercise on Camp Lejeune, N.C., March 6, 2019. This training incorporates multiple combat elements to maintain mission readiness and enhance operational effectiveness. (U.S. Marine Corps video by Lance Cpl. Aaron Douds)
TAGS,2/2,usmc,gas,cbrn,field training,2d mardiv,commstrat
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Schlieffen Plan | Wikipedia audio article
This is an audio version of the Wikipedia Article:
00:04:20 1 Background
00:04:30 1.1 iKabinettskrieg/i
00:06:08 1.2 Franco-Prussian War
00:07:54 1.2.1 iVolkskrieg/i
00:12:10 1.3 iErmattungsstrategie/i
00:15:21 1.4 Moltke (the Elder)
00:15:31 1.4.1 Deployment plans, 1871–72 to 1890–91
00:18:32 1.5 Schlieffen
00:22:51 1.5.1 Deployment plans, 1892–93 to 1905–06
00:27:30 2 Prelude
00:27:39 2.1 Moltke (the Younger)
00:31:36 2.2 Deployment plans, 1906–07 to 1914–15
00:33:20 2.2.1 iAufmarsch I West/i
00:34:33 2.2.2 iAufmarsch II West/i
00:35:56 2.2.3 iAufmarsch I Ost/i
00:37:25 2.2.4 iAufmarsch II Ost/i
00:38:50 2.3 iPlan XVII/i
00:40:37 2.4 Battle of the Frontiers
00:43:17 3 History
00:43:26 3.1 Interwar
00:43:35 3.1.1 iDer Weltkrieg/i
00:46:52 3.1.2 Hans Delbrück
00:48:01 3.2 1940s – 1990s
00:48:11 3.2.1 Gerhard Ritter
00:49:57 3.2.2 Martin van Creveld
00:53:40 3.2.3 John Keegan
00:56:52 3.3 1990s–present
00:57:01 3.3.1 German reunification
01:01:33 3.3.2 Robert Foley
01:04:09 3.3.3 Terence Holmes
01:09:15 3.3.4 Holmes–Zuber debate
01:13:56 3.3.5 Humphries and Maker
01:18:26 4 Aftermath
01:18:36 4.1 Analysis
01:24:32 5 See also
01:24:46 6 Notes
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I cannot teach anybody anything, I can only make them think.
- Socrates
SUMMARY
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The Schlieffen Plan (German: Schlieffen-Plan, pronounced [ʃliːfən plaːn]) was the name given, after the First World War, to German war plans and the influence of Field Marshal Alfred von Schlieffen and his thinking on the invasion of France and Belgium on 4 August 1914. Schlieffen was Chief of the General Staff of the German Army from 1891 to 1906. In 1905 and 1906, Schlieffen devised an army deployment plan for a war-winning offensive against the French Third Republic. After losing the First World War, German official historians of the Reichsarchiv and other writers described the plan as a blueprint for victory. Generaloberst (Colonel-General) Helmuth von Moltke the Younger, succeeded Schlieffen as Chief of the German General Staff in 1906 and was dismissed after the First Battle of the Marne (5–12 September 1914). German historians claimed that Moltke had ruined the plan by meddling with it.
Post-war writing by senior German officers like Hermann von Kuhl, Gerhard Tappen, Wilhelm Groener and the Reichsarchiv historians led by the former Oberstleutnant (Lieutenant-Colonel) Wolfgang Förster, managed to establish a commonly accepted narrative that it was Moltke the Younger's failure to follow the blueprint, rather than German strategic miscalculation, that condemned the belligerents to four years of attrition warfare instead of the quick, decisive conflict it should have been. In 1956, Gerhard Ritter published Der Schlieffenplan: Kritik eines Mythos (The Schlieffen Plan: Critique of a Myth), which began a period of revision when the details of the supposed Schlieffen Plan were subjected to scrutiny and contextualisation. Treating the plan as a blueprint was rejected, because this was contrary to the tradition of Prussian war planning established by Helmuth von Moltke the Elder, in which military operations were considered to be inherently unpredictable. Mobilisation and deployment plans were essential but campaign plans were pointless; rather than attempting to dictate to subordinate commanders, the commander gave the intent of the operation and subordinates achieved it through Auftragstaktik (mission-type tactics).
In writings from the 1970s, Martin van Creveld, John Keegan, Hew Strachan and others, studied the practical aspects of an invasion of France through Belgium and Luxembourg. They judged that the physical constraints of German, Belgian and French railways and the Belgian and northern French road networks made it impossible to move enough troops far enough and fast enough for them to fight a decisive battle if the French retreated from the frontier. Mo ...